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1. INTRODUCTION
Governments face several trade-offs in the process of planning and executing fiscal policy.
For example, a decision on the appropriate fiscal stance needs to take in to account both the
short-run impact on the economy and the long-run sustainability of public finances.
Furthermore, decisions on the methods of financing the deficit (or on the use of the surplus)
and on the composition of public expenditures also need to be made.
With regard to the latter issue, governments are involved in the provision of public
infrastructures which can increase the productivity of private firms.1 Examples include roads,
bridges, airports, and all “… those public works, which, though they may be in the highest
degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature that the profit could
never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it
therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect
or maintain.” (Adam Smith 1776). At the same time, governments spend large part of their
budgets on goods and services that can also be privately provided and, while they do not
directly impact the productivity of the private sector, are likely to affect consumers’ utility in
a way similar to private consumption. Examples of such utility-enhancing spending for
public consumption include (but are obviously not limited to) education, health, insurance
programs, defense, clean streets, and public parks.
This trade-off between productivity-enhancing public investment and utility-enhancing
public consumption is often at the forefront of the public debate and policy discussions.
Easterly, Irwin, and Serven (2007), for example, document how Latin American countries
have reduced their budget deficits by cutting public investment, mostly due to the fact that
reducing capital spending is easier in the short run (compared to reducing current spending)
for political economy reasons. Similarly, in the UK, the observation that investment projects
can often be delayed as an alternative to controlling current spending has led, in the late
1990s, to the development of a new policy framework aimed at protecting public
investment.2 Despite being a major policy issue, this trade-off has however received less
attention than it deserves in the academic literature.
Several authors, particularly since the work of Aschauer (1989) have investigated, both
theoretically and empirically, the consequences of productive public spending. This literature
includes Baxter and King (1993), Gramlich (1994), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Rioja
(1999, 2003), Feltenstein and Morris (1990), Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), Coto-
Martinez (2006), Duggal, Saltzman and Klein (2007) and Linnemann and Schabert (2006).
Very few papers in this literature, however, explicitly focus on the trade-off between
productive infrastructure spending and the welfare effects of public consumption. Prominent
exceptions are Barro (1990), who incorporates tax-financed government services that affect
1 Throughout the paper, we will use interchangeably the expressions infrastructure expenditure and capital
expenditure. Public infrastructures and public capital will also be used as synonymous.
2 See www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/mediastore/otherfiles/fiscal_policy_framework_for_public_investment.pdf
2production and utility into an endogenous growth model, and Turnovsky and Fisher (1995),
who carry out a similar analysis using a neoclassical intertemporal framework.
In this paper we analyze the trade-off related to government spending composition in the
context of a New Keynesian two-country model with imperfect competition and nominal
rigidities. Our model belongs to the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics
(NOEM) framework, which many currently regard as the workhorse model for the analysis
of macroeconomic issues in open economies.3 Compared to the existing literature, one key
innovation of our paper is that of analyzing productive public infrastructure spending in this
new modeling paradigm. While some of the papers that we reviewed contain ingredients of
the New Keynesian open economy paradigm, we are not aware of any paper that analyses the
implications of public capital in a model that features at the same time imperfect competition,
nominal rigidities and a two-country world.
As we already stressed above, the only papers of which we are aware that explicitly focus on
the trade-off between productive government spending and utility from public consumption
(Barro 1990; Turnovsky and Fisher 1995) do not belong to the New Keynesian strand of
literature and do not consider market imperfections such as monopolistic competition and
price rigidities. The analysis of how the trade-off is affected by such imperfections is a novel
contribution of our paper. In particular, in Section 4 we compare our welfare results to those
of the previous literature. We find that, contrary to Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), since initial
output and consumption are sub-optimally low in our model (due to monopolistic
competition) a shift toward productive government spending is welfare improving even in the
short run for plausible parameter values. In addition, the open economy dimension is also
important in differentiating our welfare results from those derived by Turnovsky and Fisher
(1995). In our open economy framework, unlike in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), domestic
residents can also increase short-run consumption, and therefore welfare, by running a
current account deficit.
The above discussion implies that our welfare results are more in line with the endogenous
growth model presented by Barro (1990)—in which an increase in the share of productive
capital in total government spending is welfare-enhancing at all horizons—than with the
neoclassical framework used by Turnovsky and Fisher (1995).
The open-economy dimension also allows us—unlike Barro (1990) and Turnovsky and
Fisher (1995)—to study the impact of a shift in domestic government spending composition
on the current account, the exchange rate, and on foreign variables. This analysis of how
3 The NOEM literature originated with the seminal paper of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995,
1996). Subsequent important contributions include, but are not limited to, Betts and
Devereux (2000, 2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel (2002), Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000, 2002), Hau (2000), Tille (2001), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Bergin
(2003), Kollman (2002), Sutherland (1996, 2005), Pierdzioch (2004), and Ghironi (2006).
Surveys of this literature are provided by Lane (2001), Sarno (2001), and Corsetti (2007).
Coutinho (2005) focuses on the fiscal NOEM literature.
3public infrastructures in one country affect another country is important from both the
theoretical and empirical point of view. Clarida and Findlay (1994), for example, in a
theoretical study of European integration, stress how countries engage in strategic behavior
by taking into account, in their decision on public infrastructure investment, the level of
public capital in neighboring countries. Empirically, important spillover effects are found to
be generated by public highway spending between USA states (Pereira and Andraz (2004))
and by total public capital spending between the USA and Canada (Owyong and Thangavelu
(2001)).
More in general, we see our paper as furthering the theoretical analysis of fiscal policy. This
is important because while policy makers in several countries are showing a renewed interest
in the fiscal instrument and an increasing number of academic and policy studies are focusing
on fiscal issues, the analysis of the macroeconomic and welfare impact of fiscal policy still
receives limited attention compared with that of monetary policy. In addition, as stressed by
Alesina and Perotti (1995), the academic debate on fiscal policy tends to neglect composition
issues. Fiscal policy is therefore usually modeled with reference to a general aggregate, often
identified exclusively in terms of government consumption of goods and services.4 This
implies that additional work taking into account the complexity of fiscal policy and the multi-
dimensionality of governments’ fiscal activities can be particularly useful. The spirit of this
paper is that of contributing to foster the debate in this area.
Our analysis shows that a permanent increase in domestic public infrastructure financed by a
reduction in public consumption is welfare enhancing for domestic residents, provided that
the productivity of public capital is not too low and the weight of public consumption
(compared to private consumption) in private utility not too high. However, since a negative
net welfare impact cannot be ruled out, one policy implication is that governments should
take into account household preferences with respect to public provision of goods and
services in deciding the composition of public spending.
The implementation of such a policy, moreover, has important international implications. In
particular, the impact on instantaneous foreign utility is negative in the short run, because
foreign residents have to meet an increased global demand within a relatively
underdeveloped (compared to domestic) public infrastructure system, while they only reap
the benefits of the increased global demand in the long run. Foreign long-run welfare gains,
however, more than offset the short-term losses. One implication of this analysis is that, if
foreign authorities care not only about the present discounted value of foreign utility, but also
about welfare dynamics, the domestic policy change can generate incentives for reallocation
of public spending abroad. In this case, as the foreign country tries to avoid short-run welfare
losses, it has an incentive to also increase the level of its productive public capital. A
domestic policy shift can therefore result in a virtuous global technological cycle.
4 Noteworthy exceptions, besides the papers already mentioned above, are Roche (1996), Finn (1998), Lane and
Perotti (2003), and van der Ploeg (2006).
4If the domestic shift in public spending composition is temporary, overall domestic welfare is
reduced for low levels of the productivity of public capital, but is increased for high levels.
This implies that governments which value the welfare of their citizens should carefully
evaluate the impact of planned infrastructure projects on the productivity of the private sector
before changing the public spending mix, especially in cases in which the projected increase
in productive capital stock is likely to be temporary (due, for example, to uncertainty about
securing the necessary fiscal resources to maintain it in the medium and long run).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
discusses the parameterization. Sections 4 and 5 present and discuss the results for the case of
a permanent and of a temporary shift in public spending composition, respectively. Section 6
concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The model is a standard NOEM model, similar to those developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) and Betts and Devereux (2000). Our main modelling innovations, which are crucial
for the issues we want to investigate, are the introduction of productive public capital and of
utility-enhancing public consumption. We also assume that nominal rigidities take the form
of staggered price setting as in Calvo (1983), rather than one-period fixed prices.5
The model contains two countries. Firms and households are indexed by ]1,0[?z . A fraction
n of households and firms are located in the domestic country, while n?1  are located in the
foreign country. In the description of the model that follows, unless equations for the foreign
country are explicitly discussed they can be assumed to be symmetric to the equations for the
domestic country.
2.1 Households
Domestic households gain utility from private and public consumption and real balances.
They also experience disutility from supplying labor. The domestic utility function is
therefore given by
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where 10 ?? ?  is the discount factor, C is a composite good representing private
consumption and sP is the price index associated with it.
C
sG represents public consumption.
sM  denotes nominal money balances and )(zls the household’s supply of labor; 0??  is the
inverse of the consumption elasticity of money demand, and ? and ? are positive parameters.
5 We restrict our attention to the case of Producer Currency Pricing (PCP), in order to focus on the international
impact of government spending composition, rather than on deviations from the Purchasing Power Parity.
5The composite private consumption good is defined in the following equation as an
aggregate across the individual goods produced by firms
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where ? is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of individual goods. The associated
price index is
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where )(zpt is the price of good z expressed in domestic currency, )(
* zpt  is the foreign
currency price of foreign good z and E is the exchange rate, defined as the price of the
foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency.
The budget constraint of the domestic representative household is given by
tttttttttttt PCPzlwMDDM ??? ??????? ?? )(11 (4)
where D denotes the household’s holding of domestic currency denominated nominal bonds,
which account for international shifts in wealth, ? is the price of a bond (the inverse of one
plus the nominal interest rate), tw  is the nominal wage paid to the household in a competitive
labor market, ? is the household’s share of profits received by firms and ? denotes real lump-
sum taxes paid to the government. Given that bonds are denominated in domestic currency,
the budget constraint of the foreign representative household is
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where foreign variables are denoted by asterisks.
The first order conditions are given by
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Equations (6) and (7) are the Euler equations for optimal domestic and foreign consumption,
respectively. Equations (8) and (9) are the domestic and foreign optimal labor supply
equations, which equate the disutility of supplying an extra unit of labor with the marginal
utility of the extra private consumption that can be bought due to the marginal increase in
labor supply. Finally, equations (10) and (11) show that households’ optimal money demand
is an increasing function of private consumption and a decreasing function of the interest
rate.
2.2 The Government
The consolidated budget constraint of the monetary and fiscal authorities, expressed in per-
capita terms, is given by
t
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where total government spending tG  is distributed between public consumption
C
t
G and
public capital I
t
G , according to the formula It
C
tt GGG ?? . In the experiments that we carry
out in this paper, only the composition of (domestic) government spending changes. Total
government spending, taxes and the money supply (as well as foreign composition of
government spending) are kept constant throughout our exercises.
Government consumption takes the same form as the private sector’s consumption index and
it is thus given by
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An analogous index governs public capital spending. Government spending on public capital
and consumption are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process described by the
following equations
I
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where ?  governs the persistence of a fiscal shock, I? and C? are unpredictable shifts in the
components of government spending and the hat notation represents percentage deviations
from the initial steady state.
72.3 Private Firms
Technology
Each firm produces a differentiated good. The production function of a representative
domestic firm z is
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G
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where )(zyt is the output of firm z , )(zlt  is the labor input used by firm z and ? >0 measures
the productivity of public capital. 0K  is the country’s initial endowment of public capital—
independent of government spending—which captures the impact of natural resources. GK is
the stock of public capital provided by government spending, which evolves according to
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where ? is the depreciation rate.
One obvious shortcoming of our model is the absence of private capital. This is a limitation
shared with large part of the NOEM literature, which usually assumes that labor is the only
factor of production. The papers—discussed in the Introduction—which focus on the impact
of productive public spending in a closed economy usually assume that private capital also
enters the production function. Since our framework complicates the modeling strategy by
introducing the open economy dimension, we abstract from private capital so as to avoid
overly complicating the model.
If public and private capital are complements in production—as it is likely to be the case for
most categories of productive public investment (for example, roads and airports)—
increasing the stock of public capital would also increase the marginal productivity of private
capital. In this case the introduction of private capital in our model would produce results
qualitatively similar to the ones we derive here. From the quantitative point of view, the
impact of raising the share of productive public spending would be magnified. We therefore
believe that excluding private capital does not—in our model—fundamentally alter the
implications of shifting public spending towards the kind of large infrastructure projects that
we have in mind in motivating this paper.
Profits
Domestic firms minimize their costs )(zlw tt subject to (16). The nominal marginal cost is
given by
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The profits of domestic firms are given by
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Equations (19) and (12) can be substituted into the households’ budget constraint equation
(4) to derive the consolidated budget constraint of the domestic economy
ttttttttt GPCPzyzpDD ???? ? )()(1? (20)
Making use of the global asset-market-clearing condition 0)1( * ??? tt DnnD , the
consolidated budget constraint of the foreign economy can be derived in an analogous way as
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The fact that the law of one price holds in each country and domestic and foreign households
consume identical consumption baskets implies the following demand curve for each
differentiated good z
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where WtC  is world private consumption demand, given by
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W
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and world total government spending WtG is defined in an analogous way.
Price Setting
In the absence of nominal rigidities, each home firm would maximize its profits using
)(zp as the choice variable. This would imply
)(
1
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Following Calvo (1983), we introduce nominal rigidities by assuming that each firm resets its
prices with a probability ??1  in each period, independently of other firms and
independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Each firm has to take into
9account, when setting its profit-maximizing price, that in every subsequent period there is a
probability 10 ?? ?  that it will not be able to revise its price setting decision. When setting a
new price in period t , each firm seeks to maximize the present value of profits weighting
future profits by the probability that the price will still be effective in that period. Thus the
representative home firm seeks to maximize
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where st ,?  is the domestic discount factor between period t and period s, defined as
1
, )1(
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? ??? jt sjst i? where i denotes the nominal interest rate. The result is that the pricing
rule for home good z is given by
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All firms in a country are symmetric and every firm that changes its price in any given period
chooses the same price and output consistently with (26). The structure of price setting
implies that each period a fraction of ??1  of firms sets a new price and the remaining
fraction keeps their price unchanged.
2.4 The Initial Steady State
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state where all exogenous variables
are constant. In addition, initial net foreign assets and government capital spending are both
zero. As it is clear from equation (16), the assumption of an initial endowment of public
capital implies that public capital is positive in the initial steady state even though initial
public investment is zero. In any case, the linearized dynamic effects analyzed in this paper
are independent of the initial level of public capital.
In existing NOEM models total government spending is usually assumed to be zero at the
initial steady state. We depart from this practice by assuming that government consumption
is positive and equal in both countries at the initial steady state. This allows us to carry out
policy exercises in which a reduction in public consumption is used to finance an increase in
public capital. We also assume that the initial level of private consumption is equal in both
countries.
Our assumptions imply that the optimal labor supply (8), the pricing rule (24), the production
function (16) and their foreign equivalent equations can be combined to yield the following
relationships between steady-state output, labor supply, and consumption
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where 0 subscripts denote the initial steady state.6
3. PARAMETERIZATION
We simulate our model for a benchmark parameterization and we check the sensitivity of our
results by also considering alternative values for the productivity of public capital and the
weight of public consumption in private utility.
In the benchmark parameterization, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods
? is set equal to 6, implying a 20 percent mark-up of prices over marginal costs in the steady
state. The subjective discount factor ? is set at 1/1.05, which implies a 5 percent annual real
interest rate. The price stickiness parameter ? is assumed to be equal to 0.5, implying an
average delay between price adjustments of two years.7 As it can be seen by looking at
equation (10) and its foreign equivalent, the parameter ?  determines both the consumption
and interest elasticity of money demand. We set ?  equal to 9, which implies a consumption
elasticity of money demand of 1/9 and an interest rate elasticity of money demand of -1/9.8
We normalize the endowment of natural resources in each country as follows: 1*00 ?? KK .
The two countries are assumed to be of equal size, i.e. 5.0?n . The ratio of initial total
government spending (i.e. initial public consumption to output) is set to 0.2.
In the benchmark simulations presented below, we assume that the utility provided by public
consumption is low compared to that provided by private consumption. We therefore set
4.0?? . We also need to specify values for the productivity and depreciation rate of public
capital parameters, ? and ? . The latter is assumed to be 0.10 (as in Baxter and King 1993
6 The derivation of equations (27)-(30) is also based on the fact that initial output is equal to the sum of initial
private and public consumption in each country. This is a consequence of the assumption of zero initial net
foreign assets holdings.
7 Carlton (1986) suggests that that in various industries is not unusual for prices to remain unchanged for several
years.
8 Our parameterization is mostly consistent with Sutherland (1996).
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and Rioja 2003). The existing literature is far from conclusive on what a plausible value for
? could be. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) surveys paper which have attempted to estimate
the productivity of public capital. Results vary from a statistically insignificant ? (Hulten
and Schwab 1991) to 0.39 (Aschauer 1989). Although Aschauer’s upper bound is widely
cited, most studies criticize it as too high and find estimates which are positive but much
smaller. We therefore consider two values of ? in our experiments, 05.0?? (as in Baxter
and King 1993) and 1.0??  (as in Rioja 2003).
In what follows we consider the domestic and international impact of both permanent and
temporary shocks to government spending composition in the domestic country. In the case
of permanent shocks the persistency parameter ? is set to 1 in equations (14) and (15). In the
case of temporary shocks, we set this parameter to 0.8. We simulate the model using the
algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001).
4. A PERMANENT SHIFT IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING COMPOSITION
In this section we consider a permanent one percentage increase in home government
infrastructure investment relative to initial output and a simultaneous one percentage
decrease in home government consumption relative to initial output. Total government
spending is therefore constant both at home and in the foreign country. The composition of
foreign public spending is unchanged compared to the initial steady state. We evaluate the
impact of such a policy on the main domestic and foreign macroeconomic variables as well
as on domestic and foreign welfare.
The results for this case are presented in Figure 1. The vertical axes show percentage
deviations from the initial steady state. For variables whose initial steady state value is zero,
the percentage deviations are expressed in relation to initial output.
4.1 The Impact on the Domestic Economy
Figure 1 shows that a shift in the composition of public spending towards public capital
generates a boom in the domestic economy, by increasing domestic output. This is consistent
with the findings of other papers which have investigated the impact of an increase in public
capital in closed economies (for example, Baxter and King 1993). The basic intuition for this
result is that an increase in public capital leads to an expansion of production possibilities,
thus implying an increase in domestic output.
Since the accumulation of public capital is gradual, the increase in domestic output is equally
gradual, with an almost insignificant impact in the short run. However, since domestic
households anticipate the medium and long-run increase in output, they increase private
consumption immediately in order to smooth consumption intertemporally. This implies that
the domestic economy must run a current account deficit in the short run to be able to
consume more than it is producing in anticipation of future productivity gains. Consequently,
in order to service the accumulated external debt domestic output has to increase more than
consumption in the long run.
12
Figure 1. The Effects of a Permanent Shift in Government Spending
Composition
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A prima facie interpretation of these results could lead to the conclusion that a domestic shift
in the composition of public spending towards public infrastructure worsens the
sustainability of the domestic economy by increasing its external debt. However, if we take
the view that public capital increases a country’s net worth (see, for example, Milesi-Ferretti
and Moriyama (2006)), then the accumulation of external debt does not necessarily imply a
worsening of total domestic net worth, since it is more than offset by the permanent increase
in public capital.
Figure 1 also highlights the role of ? . A higher ? increases the productivity of public capital
more, thus implying a further expansion of production possibilities, which results in higher
domestic output. An increase in?  also increases the domestic marginal productivity of labor;
this allows domestic firms to produce more output for a given labor input. Equations (18) and
(24) imply that an increase in ? would reduce prices if these were perfectly flexible.
However, due to the presence of nominal rigidities, prices cannot be reduced to fully match
the increase in productivity. The fact that output increases while prices are only partially
adjusted results in higher domestic profits in the short run. Since domestic firms are owned
by domestic households, higher profits are re-distributed to them, partly translating into
higher consumption for a higher level of ? .
Figure 1(h) also shows that a shift in the composition of spending has a non-monotonic
impact on home employment, since it tends to reduce it in the short run, but raise it in the
medium and long run. In addition, an increase in ? has a similar non-monotonic impact. This
can be seen by comparing the results for 05.0??  and 1.0??  in Fig. 1 (h). A higher
? generates lower domestic employment in the short-run (the first ten periods after the
shock) but higher domestic employment afterwards.
The results described above reflect various effects at work following an increase in the level
and productivity of public capital. One obvious implication of higher and/or more productive
public capital is that the same level of output can be produced with less labor effort. This
“pure public capital productivity” effect explains why domestic employment initially falls
when the level of public capital is increased, and why it falls more if the productivity of
public capital is higher.
However, higher and more productive public capital also implies that, on average, the prices
of domestic goods are lower. This raises the real wage, thus generating incentives for higher
domestic labor supply. In addition to this increase in the real wage, the domestic
accumulation of current account deficit reduces domestic households’ net wealth, thus
pushing them to increase their labor supply (i.e. to decrease their consumption of leisure). In
the medium and long run, the wealth effect stemming from the current account deficit,
together with the impact of the higher real wage, more than offset the pure public capital
productivity effect. The interaction of these various effects thus explains the non-monotonic
impact of both a shift towards public capital and of a higher ? on domestic labor supply.
Intuitively, these results imply that the short-run impact of productive capital in the economy
might result in a job-less expansion, due to the generalized increase in productivity, while in
the medium and long run the benefits of expanding the production possibilities of the
economy will manifest themselves not only on economic activity but also on employment.
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4.2 The Open Economy Impact
As we stressed in the Introduction, one advantage of the open economy set-up is that it
enables us to assess the impact of shifts in public spending composition on the exchange rate
and on foreign variables.
Figure 1(e) shows that an increase in productive capital in the domestic economy implies an
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate (a fall of the price of the foreign currency
expressed in terms of the domestic currency). The main mechanism at work is a “money
demand” effect arising through higher domestic consumption: as discussed in Section 4.1,
domestic consumption increases, both in absolute terms and relative to foreign one, when the
domestic government shifts its spending composition towards productive capital. Since
money demand is a positive function of consumption (see equations 10 and 11), an increase
in domestic consumption relative to foreign one increases domestic money demand
compared to foreign one. An appreciation of the domestic currency is therefore required to
reestablish equilibrium in the money market. The fact that domestic consumption increases
more when ? is higher implies that the money demand effect is stronger in that case. This
explains why the domestic currency appreciates even more when public capital is more
productive.
Figure 1(c) also shows that foreign output increases in the short run and slightly declines in
the long run following a shift in domestic public spending composition, while foreign private
consumption displays an opposite response. The short-run increase in foreign output can be
explained by both an “expenditure switching” and an “expenditure boosting” effect. The
expenditure switching effect is due to the fact that an appreciation of the domestic currency
makes foreign goods cheaper. This shifts some of the higher world demand away from
domestic and towards foreign goods. However, since the effect on the exchange rate is small
in our model, so is the expenditure switching effect.
What accounts for the bulk of the short-run increase in foreign output is therefore the
expenditure boosting effect, due to higher aggregate demand in the world economy in the
wake of an increase in production possibilities in the domestic economy. As we have seen, an
immediate implication of the latter is a consumption boom in the domestic economy. Since
household preferences do not display home bias, part of the higher domestic demand falls on
foreign goods, thus explaining why foreign output increases on impact.
The decrease in private foreign consumption in the short run can be explained with the help
of the initial steady-state equations (Equations 27-30). Taking in to account that the initial
endowment of natural resources of the two countries is normalized in the simulations
( 1*00 ?? KK ), the initial steady state equations for the domestic and foreign country,
respectively, become
0
00
11
C
ly ?
? ??? (31)
15
*
0
*
0
*
0
11
C
ly ?
? ??? (32)
Equations (31) and (32) are valid only for the initial steady state and under the assumption of
fully flexible prices. An interpretation of these equations is therefore that—neglecting both
the distortions due to price rigidities and the international impact of the shift in public
spending composition in the domestic country—there should be in each country a negative
relationship between the levels of output and consumption. The intuition for such negative
relationship is found in the need to keep households’ supply of labor on an optimal path
according to equations (8) and (9). Abstracting from fiscal policy shocks, the private utility
function (1) and the production function (16) (and their foreign counterparts) imply that if
output increases the marginal disutility of providing an additional amount of labor also
increases. In order to keep the latter disutility equal to the marginal utility of private
consumption that the increase in labor supply can buy, the marginal utility of private
consumption must also increase, and this can only be achieved with a lower level of private
consumption.
As we have already stressed above, equations (31) and (32) do not bind after the initial
steady state is disturbed. However, the fact that government spending composition is
unchanged in the foreign country ( 0
* ?IG at every horizon) implies that the relationship
between foreign output and foreign consumption does not deviate too much from the one
described by equation (32) in the periods immediately after the initial shock. Equation (32) is
more relevant than equation (31) in these periods because the increase in domestic productive
public capital after the shock ( )0?GK allows higher output with the same (or lower) level of
labor input and therefore breaks the inverse relationship between output and private
consumption that we discussed above. This makes it easier in the domestic economy,
compared to the foreign one, to have at the same time higher output and higher private
consumption.
Our interpretation is also consistent with the fact that in the long run the relationship between
foreign output and foreign private consumption becomes more difficult to explain with
reference to equation (32). Intuitively, the mechanism summarized by (32) is more relevant
the smaller is the deviation from the initial steady state. In the long run, the accumulation of
external assets by foreign households—the other side of the coin of the current account
deficit run by the domestic country—implies an increase in both private consumption and
leisure of foreign residents.
In addition, a “terms-of-trade” effect is at work in the long run. A rise in supply of domestic
goods worsens the domestic terms of trade (i.e. the price of domestic goods relative to
foreign falls). This implies that foreign consumption is higher in the long run. Both the
accumulation of external assets and the worsening in the domestic terms of trade have a
positive effect on long-run foreign private consumption.
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4.3 Welfare Impact
In this Section we focus on the welfare impact of a shift in the domestic composition of
government spending. As we stressed in the Introduction, the trade-off between utility-
enhancing public consumption and productivity-enhancing public capital is often a crucial
aspect of the public debate and of policy discussions. In spite of this, we are not aware of any
paper which explicitly focuses on this trade-off in the NOEM framework. The basic intuition
behind this trade-off is that cutting spending for public consumption directly reduces
households utility. However, if the cut in current spending is used to raise public capital, this
shift can also have a positive indirect effect on households utility, namely through the impact
of improved public infrastructure on other variables which affect private utility.
In our welfare analysis, we look at both the time path of the instantaneous utility level and
the overall accumulated welfare over the long-term planning horizon of the representative
agent. In “first generation” NOEM models such as the seminal Redux model (Obstfeld and
Rogoff 1995) prices are fixed for one period and economies reach the steady state in the
following period. In such a framework, the welfare effect of a shock is the sum of the short-
run change in utility and the discounted present value of the change in steady-state utility.
Since we have staggered price setting, we use a slightly different method to evaluate the
long-term effects of welfare changes. Namely, we calculate the present discounted value
(PDV) of the change in utility, using a large number of periods to numerically approximate
the long-term impact.
Formally, the change in domestic utility in period t  is given by
C
tttt GllCdU ˆˆˆ
2
0 ???? (33)
while an analogous expression holds for foreign utility.9  The PDV value of the change in
utility is therefore calculated as
?
?
?
??
ts
s
ts
DPV dUdU ? (34)
with an equivalent expression holding for the foreign country.
Figure 1(i) illustrates the response of domestic instantaneous utility )( tdU to changes in
government spending composition for various combinations of the productivity of public
capital (? ) and the weight of public consumption in private utility (? ). Figure 1(i) shows
that a shift in composition toward public capital is more likely to be welfare enhancing in
every period for domestic households the higher is ?  and the lower? . The intuition behind
these results is straightforward. Since a decrease in public consumption directly lowers
welfare, the direct utility loss of a shift in the composition of spending is lower if households
attach a low weight to public consumption in their utility function. In addition, the loss due to
9 As customary in this literature, we neglect the utility derived from real balances.
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lower public consumption can be compensated by the fact that higher public infrastructure
allow households to consume more privately at every horizon. Furthermore, this effect is
stronger for higher values of?  (Figure 1(b)). This effect is reinforced also because higher
consumption can be achieved domestically without having to increase labor proportionally to
the increase in consumption. On the contrary, labor effort can even be reduced in the short
term (Figure 1(h)).
The welfare results presented in Figure 1(i) can be compared with those of previous papers.
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) look separately at public consumption and public investment
expansions, rather than at a shift in composition for a given level of total government
spending. They stress how in their model a permanent expansion in public investment
requires agents to sacrifice more welfare initially (compared to a permanent expansion in
public consumption) in exchange for increased steady-state welfare.10 This implies that, in
their model, an exercise like the one we consider would unambiguously reduce welfare on
impact. This is due to the fact that an increase in public investment generates a higher level
of transitional investment compared to an increase in public consumption. In Turnovsky and
Fisher’s neoclassical framework this can only be achieved by temporary reducing the level of
private consumption, thus lowering instantaneous utility in the short run.
In our model, this trade-off between short term welfare losses and long-run welfare gains of a
shift toward higher public investment can be eliminated for reasonable parameter values
(when the weight of public consumption in private utility is not too high). This is a result of
two fundamental differences between our modeling framework and the one used by
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). First, due to the to the presence of imperfect competition, the
initial output and consumption steady state is sub-optimally low in our model. As a
consequence, unlike in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), in our framework the expansion of
public capital need not happen at the expense of short-run resources available to the private
sector. Second, the open economy dimension also implies that, in our model, domestic
households can increase short-run consumption, and therefore welfare, by running a current
account deficit. This effect is absent by definition in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995): due to the
closed-economy setting, in their framework domestic agents are not able to increase
consumption in the short run by accumulating external debt.
The discussion above implies that, from the point of view of the short-run welfare effects,
our new Keynesian framework is closer to the endogenous growth model presented by Barro
(1990) than to Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). In Barro (1990) an increase in the share of
productive government spending over total spending unambiguously raises the rate of growth
of output and private savings at all horizons, with a positive impact on utility.
10 See Turnovsky and Fisher (1995, p. 769).
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Table 1. PDV of Change in Utility in the Case of a Permanent Shift in Government Spending
Composition
Parameterization
DPVdU *DPVdU
?  =0.05;? =0.2 2.2 0.6
?  =0.05;? =0.4 -2.0 0.6
?  =0.10;? =0.4 4.4 1.2
So far, the discussion has focused on the path of instantaneous utility. Table 1 shows the
PDV of welfare for the same parameterizations considered in Figure 1.11 Overall, the results
presented in Table 1 suggest that a shift toward public infrastructure is welfare enhancing
domestically if the weight of public consumption (compared to private consumption) in
private utility is low and/or the productivity of public capital is high. However, since a
negative welfare impact cannot be ruled out when the weight of public consumption in
private utility is relatively high (see the case ? =0.05 and ? =0.4) the results also imply that
governments should take into account households’ preferences with respect to public
provision of services in order to evaluate shifts in the composition of public spending.
Similarly, given the importance of changes in? for the welfare results, the impact of planned
infrastructure projects on the productivity of the private sector should be evaluated as
carefully as possible before changing the public spending mix.
Figure 1(j) presents the impact on foreign instantaneous utility of a domestic shift in public
spending composition. The foreign equivalent of the production function (16), the
assumption that the country’s endowment of natural resources is normalized to 1, and the
absence of a shift in foreign public spending composition imply that foreign output is equal
to foreign employment at any time. In other words, foreign households do not benefit from
the expansion of production possibilities experienced in the home country which allows
domestic residents to consume more without necessarily increasing their work effort. As we
have seen in Section 4.2, foreign private consumption falls and foreign employment increases
in the short run following the domestic policy shock. The international consequence of the
shift in public spending decided by the home country is therefore a reduction of foreign
instantaneous utility in the short run. This negative international welfare spillover is reversed
in the medium and long run, due to the changes in the paths of foreign private consumption
and employment discussed in section 4.2. Table 1 illustrates that the overall effect on the
PDV of foreign utility is positive because the positive medium and long run effects of the
domestic policy shift more than offset the negative short-run impact. The main intuitive
explanation for the increase in overall foreign welfare is related to the terms of trade effect:
an increase in the supply of domestic goods induces an improvement in the terms of trade of
the foreign country, resulting in a higher level of foreign consumption.
11 For instance, if 05.0??  and 2.0?? , a permanent shift in government spending increases the PDV of
domestic utility by 2.2 percent and the PDV of foreign utility by 0.6 percent. The numerical values presented in
Tables 1 and 2 are calculated using 200 periods.
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Figure 1(j) also shows that the negative short-run impact on instantaneous foreign utility is
stronger for higher values of ? . This has interesting implications for international policy
coordination. In the short run, the more efficient is the reallocation of public spending
decided by the domestic authorities (the higher ? ), the more the domestic policy change
harms foreign residents. The intuitive explanation for this result is that having more efficient
infrastructure generates a competitive advantage for the domestic economy compared to the
foreign. The domestic expansion of productive possibilities also generates some positive
international demand spillovers which partially benefit foreign residents. However, foreign
residents have to meet the increased global demand within a relatively underdeveloped
(compared to domestic) public infrastructure system. Figure 1(j) shows that the positive
spillover impact of the domestic policy shift does not offset the domestic competitive
advantage quickly enough to prevent foreign welfare from falling in the short run.
One implication of this analysis is that the domestic policy change and the associate short run
welfare loss of the foreign country can generate incentives for reallocation of public spending
also in the foreign country. Although the impact on the PDV of foreign utility is positive for
reasonable parameter values (Table 1), if foreign authorities are worried about welfare
dynamics (not only about the PDV of utility) they will still try to offset the negative short run
effect of the domestic policy. In order to do so, they will have an incentive to also increase
the level of foreign productive public capital in response to the domestic policy. In such
circumstances, a domestic policy shift can therefore trigger a virtuous global technological
cycle.
5. A TEMPORARY SHIFT IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING COMPOSITION
In this Section we assess the impact of a temporary shift in domestic government spending
composition. In this policy experiment the persistency parameter ? is set to 0.8 in equations
(14) and (15). Figure 2 and Table 2 illustrate the results in this case.12
Table 2. PDV of Change in Utility in the Case of a Temporary Shift in Government Spending
Composition
Parameterization
DPVdU *DPVdU
?  =0.05;? =0.4 -0.4 0.1
?  =0.10;? =0.4  0.9 0.2
As Figure 2(g) shows, depreciation of public capital implies that the stock of public
infrastructure accumulated while public investment was temporarily higher is almost
12 Figures 2 shows that, although the solution of the model is stable, it takes more than 40 periods to reach the
new steady state.
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completely depleted about 40 periods after the shock. This dynamics implies that the increase
in productivity of domestic firms is also only temporary. The temporary increase in
productivity brings about a temporary rise in domestic output, which is, for obvious reasons,
more pronounced for higher values of ? (Figure 2(a)). Domestic households also temporarily
increase consumption following the temporary increase in productivity (Figure 2(b)). For
consumption smoothing reasons analogous to those discussed in Section 4.1, domestic
households save part of the temporary higher income by running a current account surplus in
the medium run. Figure 2(f) shows that domestic residents accumulate a permanently higher
amount of bonds. One of the implications of a temporary increase in the stock of public
infrastructure is therefore a permanent improvement in the net worth position of the domestic
economy. Due to higher interest income, domestic private consumption is higher in the new
steady state.
The short-run response of foreign output and consumption is similar to the one displayed in
the case of permanent shifts in government spending composition, and can be explained with
arguments analogous to the ones discussed in Section 4.2. However, since the total
expenditure boosting effect stemming from an increase in domestic productivity is smaller
over the time horizon considered, the reaction of foreign variables is also quantitatively more
limited in the case of temporary shifts.
The accumulation of a current account deficit implies that foreign residents reduce both their
private consumption and their leisure (increase output) in the long run, due to reduced
wealth. However, they intertemporally smooth this behavior, thus temporarily increasing
their leisure and consumption in the medium term (Figure 2(c,d)). In addition, the more
pronounced medium-run fall in foreign output in the case of a higher ?  also reflects some
market gains of domestic firms at the expense of foreign firms, since the nominal
appreciation of the domestic currency (Figure 2(e)) is more than offset by the fact that
domestic prices are likely to fall more than foreign prices in the medium run when ?  is
higher. This in turn is because a higher level of ?  reduces domestic (but not foreign)
marginal costs and therefore domestic (but not foreign) prices.
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Figure 2. The Effects of a Temporary Shift in Government Spending Composition
Figure 2(i) shows that, contrary to the case of a permanent shift, a temporary domestic policy
shift can reduce instantaneous domestic welfare in the short run even when ? is high (i.e.
1.0?? ). This can intuitively be explained by the fact that the expansion of production
possibilities is much more limited when the shift is only temporary. Domestic households
therefore cannot expand private consumption as much as in the permanent case. The impact
of the reduction of public consumption hence dominates domestic utility in the short run. In
the long run, C
t
G returns to the initial level, thus neutralizing the negative welfare impact of
the temporary reduction in public consumption. However, domestic welfare increases in the
long run (rather than just returning to the pre-shock level) because the higher wealth
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accumulated by domestic residents through running a current account surplus allows them to
reduce their supply of labor while at the same time increasing private consumption. Table 2
shows that the PDV of domestic welfare is positive for a high level of ?  (?  =0.10). In this
case,  the long run improvement in instantaneous utility more that offsets the short run
reduction in terms of PDV. On the other hand, if ? is low (?  =0.05), the PDV of domestic
utility is negative.
In terms of foreign welfare, Figure 2(j) shows that the impact on instantaneous utility is
driven by foreign consumption and output movements, and is negative in the short and the
long run but briefly positive in the medium run. The short-term welfare loss of foreign agents
is more limited compared to domestic residents, because foreigners do not see their utility
reduced by a cut in publicly provided consumption. This is implies that, as shown in Table 2,
the PDV of foreign utility is positive both for high and for low values of ? .
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we focused, in the context of an open-economy model with imperfect
competition and nominal rigidities, on the trade-offs faced by governments in deciding the
allocation of public spending between productivity-enhancing public infrastructures and
utility-enhancing public consumption.
Our analysis shows that shifts in the composition of public spending have important positive
and welfare implications, both domestically and abroad. In particular, a temporary increase in
the domestic stock of public capital financed by a reduction in public consumption reduces
domestic welfare if the productivity of public capital is low. If the policy shift is permanent,
domestic utility is increased if the productivity of government spending is not too low and
the importance of public consumption (relative to private consumption) in private utility is
not too high. However, since a negative welfare impact cannot be ruled out when the weight
of public consumption in private utility is relatively high, one policy implication of our
results is that governments should take into account households’ preferences with respect to
public provision of services in order to evaluate shifts in the composition of public spending.
Similarly, given the importance of changes in? for the welfare results, the impact of planned
infrastructure projects on the productivity of the private sector should be evaluated as
carefully as possible before changing the public spending mix. These concerns are valid in
the cases of permanent as well as temporary shifts in the composition of public spending,
since in both cases the PDV of domestic welfare can be negative for reasonable
parameterizations.
With regards to the effect on foreign welfare, a domestic shift in government spending
implies a reduction of short-tem foreign instantaneous utility, while the PDV of foreign
welfare is positive, as the benefits of the global expansion in demand are reaped in the
medium-long run by the foreign country. If foreign authorities are worried not only about the
PDV of utility, but also about welfare dynamics, they will still try to offset the negative
short-run welfare effect of the domestic policy. In this case, they will have an incentive to
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increase the level of foreign productive public capital. In such a situation a domestic policy
shift can therefore trigger a virtuous global technological cycle.
Some of our results might obviously be sensitive to the specification of our model. In
particular, we assume that public and private consumption enter private utility in a non-
separable way. This means that the decrease in utility-enhancing public consumption
necessary to finance the increase in productive public infrastructure does not affect the
marginal utility of private consumption. Non-separability between private and public
consumption could of course be an interesting case to consider in future research. How our
results would be affected by the introduction of non-separability would depend on whether
public and private consumption are substitute or complements. Another interesting extension
of the model would be the introduction of asymmetry between the domestic and foreign
countries. This could be achieved, for example, by introducing home bias in private and
public consumption.
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